By: Juweyria Ali
Moyale is a strategically important border town divided between Ethiopia’s Somali and Oromo regional states. Unfortunately, this strategic town is currently hosting an ongoing tragic events that have prompted a wider discussion on competing ethno-nationalist power struggles, ethno-territorial conflicts, and identity-driven geopolitics in Ethiopia, particularly as they pertain to Oromo and Somali communities. Although the social media is certainly not the place to scrutinize some of these complex themes, let me address a few recurring issues I have seen over the past few weeks.
What we have been seeing, even from those supposedly preaching peace and co-existence, is complete and total political gaslighting directed at Somalis. At the very center of this is the willful distortion of the fact that the violence, which has already displaced countless people, started because the flag of Somali Regional State was raised on the SOMALI side of Moyale. This is an undeniable fact. Furthermore, it is no secret that this latest round of violence was directly fueled by the Somali regional government’s decision to grant city council status to Moyale on the Somali side, even though on the Oromia side in Moyale already has that exact same status. If territorial expansion is not the aim, why should anyone object to how Somalis administer their own side of the border?
An example of political gaslighting: We keep hearing that this is simply a local clash between two neighboring and interconnected communities. This framing is part of a systematic campaign to downplay the underlying problems, which go far beyond what they want us to believe.
The seriousness of the Moyale question
This isn’t a random conflict that has just erupted, and no, Somalis in Moyale have not been living in peace for the past eight years. For example, Somalis in Moyale will tell you that they have not enjoyed freedom of movement for some time. If they need to go to Addis Ababa, many have to travel via Nairobi because the road is not safe for Somalis.
They have been cut off from the rest of their own Somali Regional State, facing hunger, restrictions on food aid and essential goods coming from the rest of the state. There are two ways of evicting people from their homes: one is direct expulsion through attacks or forced removal; the other is to create coercive conditions making life so intolerable that they have no choice but to flee. Both of these methods have been used continuously against Somalis.
Being honest about the true cause of this conflict, and the real issues at stake, is the first step to achieving a genuine solution in Moyale. Trying to reduce the conflict to a local clan conflict is dishonest and counter-productive, which will only make the situation worse. The elements who are behind the escalating of the situation are using lies.
- Somalis received some form of backing from the TPLF-led EPRDF system.
- EPRDF enabled them to make territorial gains.
Despite all these lies, let me remind you of the sham 2004 referendum. That so-called referendum took place when the Somali Regional State was at its weakest, amid leadership changes and being in the middle of armed struggle that resulted in the loss of territory in Somali Regional State. Therefore, any suggestion that Somalis benefited anything from the EPRDF, except death and destruction, is laughable. If anyone benefited from the EPRDF, it was the OPDO, which was itself a member of the ruling coalition. That is precisely how they were able to block the referendum in Moyale, as Abadula Gemeda himself discussed in an interview which has been circulating online. They were able to do so, and make other territorial gains at the expense of the Somalis, because they were part of the very power structure they now claim benefited Somalis.
Some Somali commentators have described the aggression against Somalis in Moyale as state-backed. This has in turn angered many Oromo commentators and media personalities, who themselves have been critical of the federal government. Why is the suggestion of state involvement treated as more outrageous than the violence itself? If the claim is wrong, challenge the evidence. It may be that criticism of state conduct feels like criticism of Oromo political leadership or Oromos collectively – but these are tough conversations that need to be had. The same OPDO elites who orchestrated the sham 2004 referendum are now essentially in power. Why would any Somali in their sane mind view the state as a neutral actor in this conflict, especially given their failure to prevent it in the first place?
I don’t use the terms ‘Oromo’ and ‘Somali’ to imply uniformity of ideas or some sort of homogeneity within either community. Their respective nationalisms are subject to processes of formation and reformation as well as internal contradictions. I use these terms to capture some of the prevailing ideas and narratives circulating, particularly among those who claim to speak for their communities.
How does the saying go? If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck…
Oromo intellectuals who have been attempting to separate present-day Oromo nationalism from Ethiopian nationalism, in a bid to downplay the sheer level of grand strategy involved in the former’s pursuit of strategic territory, must appreciate that, to all other Ethiopians, there are clear synergies between the two. As Faisal Roble and Billow Kerrow have argued, there is a culture of ethicizing political power in Ethiopia whereby whichever ethnic group holds power becomes the guardian of Ethiopian state nationalism and suppresses anyone who challenges the prerogatives of the state. Whether previously secessionist or historically marginalized, those who assume power become the new sheriffs in town, aggressively institutionalizing Ethiopian state nationalism entangled with their own ethno-nationalism. They also appropriate and deploy the symbolism associated with state nationalism, including the dehumanizing and chauvinistic labels reserved for particular communities. Somalis, for instance, are portrayed as landless, lawless, irredentist nomads who are somehow simultaneously Al-Shabaab and the Somali national government reincarnated! When the same Oromo nationalists who used to call for the total dismantling of the Ethiopian state now warn that ‘if Somalis are not put in their place, they will claim Addis Ababa’, this raises an eyebrow. All the more so when they police Somali nationalist outrage in the face of attacks because of its ‘anti-Ethiopian’ orientation. Does that make sense?
One of the most striking examples of political gaslighting directed at Somalis is the patronizing and paternalistic insistence on telling them how to address their own struggles, how to express their outrage, which grievances are valid, and whether they should call out injustice at all. Apparently, eight years of peace and stability should be enough to silence their grievances, as though peace is a favor bestowed upon them they must repay with silence and servitude. The bar for what Somalis in Ethiopia deserve is set so low that they are expected to be grateful simply for not being slaughtered, and to treat that as reason enough to remain silent in the face of aggression.
